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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
JOSEPH S. GASSER, JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
LYMAN DAYTON, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
STATE OF UTAH 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15394 
This action is based on an oral agreement whereby plaintiff transferred 
~Y check $5,000.00 to defendant on August 26, 1969. Plaintiff alleges the 
transfer was a loan to be repaid within one year, whereas defendant alleges 
the transfer was an investment, repayment of which was contingent upon the 
~rofitability of a current film venture. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From a Judgment for the defendant of 
no cause of action, plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant seeks reversal of the Judgment and Judgment in his favor as 
l matter of 1 aw. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff was a r~sident of Salt Lake County, Utah, and the defendant 
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was a resident of the State of California and engaged in various aspects 
of motion picture production during all times material to this action. 
During midsummer of 1969, defendant first became acquainted with plaintiff. 
(Tr. p. 18) As a result of conversations between plaintiff and defendant, 
plaintiff transferred S5,000.00 to defendant. (Tr. p. 3, 17-18) 
Plaintiff alleges that he loaned $5,000.00 to defendant 
. for som' 
of his business ventures and his family expenses." (Tr. p. 11) Plaintiff 
knew defendant was working on a film entitled "Sing a Sad Song for Sarah" arc 
that the business venture for which the money would be used was for the fib. 
(Tr. p. 11) Plaintiff further alleges that the money was to be repaid 
within one year and although there was never any discussion as ~o interest, 
plaintiff expected normal interest. (Tr. p. 4-5) Plaintiff sent the $5,000 
check with a letter dated August 26, 1g59, which letter made no mention of 
the funds being a loan. (R. p. 21) Approximately two years later, plainti:· 
for the first time, contacted defendant by letter asking for repayment, 
calling the transfer of funds a loan. (Tr. p. 7-8) Defendant responded by 
letter dated August 16, 1g71_ (R. p. 22) Finally, on January 13, 1972, 
plaintiff wrote defendant a second letter requesting repayment of the funds 
because of plaintiff's "very shakey" economic situation. (R. p. 24) 
Defendant claims that the $5,000.00 1vas an investment. He states tha' 
sometime in midsummer of 1969, he explained to plaintiff that they were 
completing a film called "Sing a Sad Song for Sarah," and that in order to 
obtain "answer prints," they needed additional funding. (Tr. p. 18-19) 
Defendant further informed plaintiff that repayment of the funds was condi: 
upon the movie generating sufficient revenue to pay the funds back. (Tr. ;. 
20) After receiving plaintiff's letter of August 4, 1971, (R. p. 23), de· 
fendant responded by letter dated August 16, 1g71, and enclosed therein 
3 
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"financial program" in order to give plaintiff an "up-to-date progress report" 
on the movie. (R. p. 22) It was rlefendant's custom "to send to each of the 
investors a progress report and a projection as to those points of marketinq 
strategies that we had tried to put into effect." (Tr. p. 24) In defendant's 
letter of August 16, 1971, he also stated, "I'm hoping that foroian sales 
will make it possible to give a remittance of the $5,000.00 sooner." (R. p. 22) 
and that by making that statement, the defendant was "hoping that through 
foreign sales, we could generate income so we could return the investment to 
Mr. Gasser as well as other investors." (Tr. p. 25) Plaintiff received a two 
percent interest in the profits of the picture for his $5,000.00 investment. 
(Tr. p. 20,32) Although plaintiff acknowledged that if the film were success-
ful, he would receive a share of the profits, he claims he had no ownership 
in the movie. (Tr. p. 5) Defendant stated that in some cases investors re-
ceived a written agreement to evidence their ownership, but is not sure who 
did and did not receive the written acknowledgment. (Tr. p. 23-33) 
ARGU~1ENT 
POINT 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S FINDING THAT 
THE $5,000.00 RECEIVED BY THE DEFENDANT WAS AN INVESTMENT. 
In its findings of fact, the Trial Court found that the S5,000.00 trans-
ferred from plaintiff to defendant was an investment for the movie, "Sing a 
Sad Song for Sarah," (Tr. p. 40) and that plaintiff was aware that the funds 
·•ere an investment at the time of transfer. (R. p. 40) Further, the Trial 
Court found that the repayment of the investment was to be made out of the 
profits of the film, of which plaintiff had a two percent ownership interest. 
(R. p. 40) It is clear from the record and transcript of the case that there 
is substantial evidence to support these findings. 
Utah law states that the governing principle for review of this case is 
-3-
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the "substantial evidence rule." Cannon v. Wright, 531, P.2d 1290, Utah 
2d This case is a classic example of the reason the substant 1"al ev i denco 
rule should govern on appeal. 
"As we have often reiterated, it is the prerogative of the Trial 
Co~rt _to determine what aspects of the evidence he will believe. 
Th1s 1ncludes that he can be selective and choose those portions 
?f_the testimony of any witness he thinks has the greater probab-
lllty of be1ng true. Cannon v. Wright, 531, P .2d 1290, Utah 2d. 
In the instant case there are four critical questions of fact on which~~ 
parties' testimony is diametrically opposed: 
l. Was the $5,000.00 a loan or an investment? Plaintiff claims the 
$5,000.00 was a loan while the defendant claims it was an investment. 
2. Was repayment conditional or unconditional? Plaintiff claims defendlr· 
was to repay the funds within a year while defendant claims repayment was 
conditional upon the film making a net profit. 
3. How was the $5,000.00 to be used? Plaintiff claims at first that 
he did not know that a portion of the funds would be used for production cos'' 
of a film, (Tr. p. 9) but after reviewing his Answers to Interrogatories, 
he acknowledges that the funds were to be used for the film. (Tr. p. 11) 
Defendant specifically recalls telling plaintiff funds were needed to compl:: 
the film, specifically for answer prints. (Tr. p. 19) 
4. Did plaintiff have an ownership interest in the film? Plaintiff 
claims he had no ownership interest in the film, (Tr. p. 5) while defendant 
claims plaintiff had a two percent ownership interest in the profits. (Tr. 
p. 20) 
The Trial Judge necessarily had to decide which witness was telling the 
truth in these critical areas of conflicting testimony. 
"Passinq upon the credibility of •t~itnesses involves to some extent 
the J·udg. ing of what ooes on in the minds of ot~ers anrl 1s therefore 
- · · · t ll 1 ng fraught with uncertainty. ~hether one bel1eves a w1tness 1s e . 
the truth often depends as much or more upon t~e impress1on the ~lt­
nessismaking as upon the words he says. His aopearance and demeanor. 
-J-
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his manner of expression and tone of voice, his apparent frank-
ness or candor, or the want.of it; his forthrightness in answer-
lng, or h1s tendency to hes1tate or evade, and in fact his whole 
personality go into the composit effect of the testimony. This 
is so even though the hearer may not be paying particular attention 
to nor separately evaluating such factors. Child v. Child 332 P. 
2d 981, 985, 8 Utah 2d 261. ' 
To enable the Trial Judge to make his finding of fact, not only did 
he have the advantage of observing the witnesses and passing upon their 
credibility, he also had additional supporting evidence to establish each 
of his findings on the four critical questions of fact. 
l. Was the $5,000.00 a loan or an investment? 
In addition to the testimony that the funds were an investment, the 
check itself had the letters "Inv." written thereon. When asked if he wrote 
the abbreviation on the check, plaintiff could only respond "I don't recall." 
(Tr. p. 12) No evidence was presented to even suggest any other means by 
~ich the abbreviation was so placed. Thus, in addition to defendant's tes-
timony, which the Trial Judge chose to believe, plaintiff's own exhibit 
helped to substantiate the Court's findings. 
2. Was repayment conditional or unconditional? 
In addition to defendant's testimony that repayment of the funds was con-
ditional upon the film making a profit, (Tr. p. 19-20) the Trial Judge received 
in evidence a letter written by defendant to plaintiff marked Exhibit 3-P. 
(R. p. 22) Enclosed with said letter was a copy of a letter which described 
the financial statement referred to in defendant's letter, (Tr. p. 24) and 
~en asked by the Court if the financial report was attached, defendant res-
Donded, "I think 1 did." (Tr. p. 24) Defendant's uncertainty on this point 
cnly further strengthens his credibility. A less than truthful person could 
'asily positively claim a document was attached to a letter, especially if 
:"e olleged attac~ed document cannot be found at a later date. Nevertheless, 
l' the risk of an important point going against him, the defendant left the 
-5-
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Court with uncertainty as to whether he in fact attached the financial 
report. However, a subsequent letter written by plaintiff to defendant 
acknowledges receipt of defendant's letter "along with a report on your 
progress. The report stated a corporation would be formed by October, a~ 
I would hear. Approximately five months have expired since then and 1 
haven't heard." (Ex P-4, R. p. 24) Plaintiff received the financial 
report and was well informed as to the financial status of the film. 
To add further evidence to the finding that repayment was conditional, 
defendant states in Exhibit P-3, "I'm hoping that foreign sales will make 
it possible to give a remii:ta!'ce cf t~e ~s.ooo.oo sooner. " (R. p. 22) 
Defendant testified that he was hoping foreign sales would generate suffic-
ient income to return the investment of plaintiff. (Tr. p. 25) Thus, in 
addition to defendant's testimony, plaintiff's Exhibits P-3 and P-4 helped 
to substantiate the Court's findings. 
3. How was the $5,000.00 to be used? 
In addition to defendant's testimony that the funds were to be used 
to help finance the final stages of the film, (Tr. p. 19,21) plaintiff's 
Answers to Interrogatories acknowledged that the funds were to be used to 
"assist the defendant in his film ventures, and in paying his personal famil) 
expenses." (Tr. p. 10, R. p. 19) Thus, even though plaintiff initially 
denied knowing a portion of the funds would be used for the film, (Tr. 
p. g) the record clearly shows he knew a portion of the funds were to be 
used for production costs of a film, specifically, "Sing a Sad Song for Sara' 
(Tr. p. 9, R. 0 . 19) Therefore, in addition to the defendant's testimony as 
to how the funds were to be used, plaintiff's interrogatories helped to sut· 
stantiate the Court's findings. 
4. Did olaintiff have an ownership interest in the film? 
-6-
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In addition to defendant's testimony that plaintiff had a two percent owner-
ship interest in net profits, defendant provided plaintiff with an up-to-
date progress report, which was his custom to do for investors. (R. p. 22) 
Thus, in addition to defendant's testimony, Exhibit P-3 helped to substan-
tiate the Court's findings. 
Plaintiff's argument deals with three "elements" that he suggests should 
overturn the Court's findings: 
1. That a demand for repayment of a loan was made by plaintiff on 
defendant by letter; 
2. That defendant did not contradict the loan claim in his response, 
and; 
3. That defendant's wife endorsed the check and deposiie1 the funds 
into a personal account. 
With regard to plaintiff's demand for repayment, it is significant that 
the transfer took place in August 1969, and according to plaintiff's tes-
timony, was to be repaid within one year. (Tr. p. 4) However, it was not 
until two years later, August 1971, that plaintiff made a demand for repay-
ment of the funds and there is no testimony to show plaintiff referred to 
the transfer as a loan at any time before the letter of August 1971. If 
plaintiff had actually considered the transfer to be a loan to be repaid 
·•ithin one year, surely he would have pressured for payment sooner than he 
did. Plaintiff's Exhibits P-2 (R. p. 23) and P-4 (R. p. 24) make it very 
clear that plaintiff was in serious financial trouble whereby he stood to 
lose all his property and this may well have clouded his recollection of 
the true nature of the transfer of the funds. 
As to the plaintiff's failure to contradict the use of the term "loan," 
defendant's letter response of August 16, 1971 (R. p. 22) when taken as a 
•hole, clearly contradicts any allegation that the transfer was a loan. 
-7-
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Finally, with regard to where the funds were deposited, defendant 
testified that he was in Mexico at the time the check arrived and the 
funds were needed in the bank. (Tr. p. 26) Thus, it is totally reasonable 
that defendant's wife would endorse the check and deposit the funds in the 
bank. Whether the funds went to the defendant's personal account or busines• 
account is not clear inasmuch as both accounts were in the same bank. (Tr. 
p. 29-30) Defendant further testified that he thought the funds went 
into his business account, but he didn't know for sure. (Tr. p. 29-30) 
Plaintiff's counsel attempts to diminish the significance of the ab-
breviation "Inv." on the original check by claiming "It must have been addea 
to the check sometime after it was drawn.", because it does not show up on 
Exhibit P-1, a xerox copy of the check. (Plaintiff-Appellant Brief p. 5) 
There is no testimony whatsoever to support this theory. The first time 
defend ant's counse 1 ever saw the or i gina 1 check and the abbreviation there· 
on was at the trial. Defendant has no way of knowing when Exhibit A, the 
xerox copy of the check, was made or by whom. Nor does defendant know~~ 
the abbreviation was placed on the check. 
Plaintiff's counsel places great emphasis on the Trial Court's comments 
at the end of the evidence. Defendant argues that this is not proper to be 
reviewed on appeal. The comments by the Trial Judge at the close of the 
testimony do not constitute evidence. Nevertheless, if considered, the 
comments give more credence to the Court's ultimate findings. After consid:· 
ing all testimony, Exhibits, and weighing the credibility of the witnesses, 
the Court found in favor of the defendant. 
Thus it is clear that the Trial Court applied the proven facts and 
made findings supported by substantial evidence. 
Plaintiff's counsel would have this Honorable Court believe the CJS~ 
-8-
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of Continental Bank & Trust Co. __ v_~~~art, 291 P.2d 890, 4 Utah 2d 153 
(1955), and In Re Behm's Estate, 213 P.2d 657, 117 Utah 151 (1950) provide 
a basis upon which this Court can rely to reverse t~e Judgment. However, 
even a cursory review of the facts in both cases reveal that neither case is 
even remotely similar to the instant case and as such should have no bearing 
upon the decision to be rendered by this Honorable Court. 
POINT II 
WHERE THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S 
RULING AND THE COURT'S FINDINGS ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE, THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT MUST BE AFFIRMED. 
The case of O'Gara vs. Findlay, 306 P.2d 1073, 6 Utah 2d 102 (1957), 
states the applicable law on appeal, namely that this Court will not overturn 
the Trial Court's findings unless the Trial Court misapplies proven facts or 
makes findings clearly against the weight of the evidence. In the instant 
case, the findings were supported by the exhibits presented at the trial 
as well as the testimony of the defendant which the Trial Court chose to 
believe. The evidence supporting the Judgment in the instant case is over-
'•helming and in complete accord with the Trial Court's findings. 
CONCLUSION 
THE (DEFENDANT) HAVING PREVAILED BELOW IS ENTITLED TO HAVE US 
SURVEY THE EVIDENCE, AND EVERY REASONABLE INFERENCE AND INTEND-
MENT THAT CAN FAIRLY BE DRAWN THEREFROM, IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVOR-
ABLE TO HIM. Child vs. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 983 8 Utah 2d 261. 
The law in Utah is very clear that if there is substantial evidence which 
furnishes a reasonable basis in support of the lower Court's findings, when 
~idence is viewed most favorable to the findings, Judgment based thereon must 
be affirmed. Lake vs. Pinder, 368 P.2d 593, 13 Utah 2d 76, Jensen vs. Eddy, 
514 ?.2d 1142, 30 Utah 2d 154. In the instant case the Trial Judge chose to 
lelieve the testimony of the defendant, which taken together with the supporting 
-9-
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documentary evidence, provides not only substantial, but overwhelming 
evidence to support the Court's findings. To find otherwise would require 
one to ignore the vantage point of the Trial Judge in assessing the credibil-
ity of witnesses and to misconstrue the documentary evidence. 
Therefore, the defendant respectfully submits that the lower Court 
was fully justified in finding no cause of action and said Judgment is 
supported by substantial evidence which provides the basis for the Judgment 
to be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Jon M. Jeppson 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 
I hereby certify that I delivered eleven (11) copies of the foregoing 
brief to the Utah Supreme Court, State of Utah, this __ day of December, 
1g77_ also certify that I delivered two (2) copies of the foregoing 
brief to Richard B. Cuatto, 318 Kearns Sui lding, Salt lake City, Utah 84101, 
the attorney for plaintiff-appellant, this day of December, 1977, pas· 
tage preprepaid thereon. 
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